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The central theme of the book under review is revealed in the title. The Freemans are interested in control and believe that the expertise of contemporary psychology can be brought to bear on the question. Their interest in specific instrumental applications of psychological knowledge leads them to focus on what they call the determinist school in psychology. The determinist approach assumes that human behavior has causes that can be discovered and that causes are often found in environmental events which precede and accompany behavior. At this point the Freemans might have proceeded to a complete and thorough discussion of the behaviorist school, focusing specifically on the operant analysis of behavior and its obvious relevance to the central question of control. Unfortunately they do not. Not only is positive reinforcement all too briefly covered but the Freemans devote a chapter to aversive techniques of control followed by chapters on political socialization, attitude change, and a discussion of “major resocialization” (prisons and the Peoples’ Republic of China are the examples!) The various topics are linked only by the fact that they are illustrated via the device of the interesting example, but such a linkage is a poor substitute for theoretical coherence which a specific focus on an operant analysis of behavior or some other theoretical model could have provided.

In reference to “interesting” examples the book would be incomplete without a discussion of Milgram’s experiments in obedience, Zimbardo’s mock prison project, or Sherif, Asch et. al. studies in conformity. They are all there, but in my judgement sometimes misinterpreted. For example, Milgram’s experiments in obedience are given as examples of aversive control! But the naive subjects do not act out of fear of punishing consequences for disobedience as much as they have a positive commitment to “science.” Obedience is the product of socialization in which positive reinforcement, modeling, and moral suasion play the significant role. Summarizing the results of the obedience syndrome under several experimental conditions Milgram concluded: “Many subjects cannot find the specific verbal formula that would enable them to reject the role assigned to them by the experimenter. Perhaps our culture does not provide adequate models for disobedience.”\(^1\)

Unable to articulate an explicit theoretical position, the authors rely on the crude question-answer format of a dialogue between a professor *cum* consultant and a student-prince. This permits the authors to formulate answers in advance of questions and to make sharp transitional leaps from one subject to the next without the necessity of explaining why they are connected. Most damaging, the dialogue format, since it is an oral medium, permits (like much of everyday conversation) superficial treatment of the subject. For example The “professor quotes from Zimbardo’s testimony before a Congressional committee regarding the mock prison experiment, i.e., the ugly aspects of “human nature”, the subjects becoming “dehumanized robots”, etc., to which the prince replies: “Wow. That’s as frightening as the behaviors that Milgram found. So regarding prisons simply as places of incarceration

leads to behavior like this?” Professor: “It can. And remember, in real prisons you hire people to be guards who want to be guards. I’d advise you give some thought to the criteria for selection.” Prince: “You’ve eliminated emphasizing the punitive and incarcerative functions of prisons. Does that mean that you advise me to emphasize the rehabilitative aspects?” Professor: “Obviously...” (p. 222). In what sense do guards want to be guards? The implication left is one of a malevolent pathology that can be rooted out by the appropriate personality inventory, thus directly contradicting the apparent findings of Zimbardo and others who have studied police-custodial behavior.2 Do prisons rehabilitate? What do we mean by rehabilitation? Such questions require answers?

The choice of the players in the dialogue is also unfortunate. The professor consultant is a modern Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* (1513), a sort of Motors’ Unclear. The historic Machiavelli served as an advisor to one Pero dei Medici, ruler of Florence (1459-1527), for whom Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* (1513), a sort of Motor’s Manual of political statecraft.3 The prince, Machiavelli advised, should not hesitate to use deceit and manipulation if necessary to stay in the saddle; politics should be considered separately from moral or ethical values.4 Thus Machiavelli was a percursor of the contemporary social scientist-consultant-grant junkie who gives power holders “expert” advice on the technology of power. Consequently the particular dialogue has a conservative, even reactionary focus, masked by technocratic jargon.

Considerable attention, for example, is given to the use of positive reinforcement in the resocialization of delinquent boys (The CASE program at the National Training Institute for Boys). The fact that the subjects are in no sense willing subjects (they are in a prison) is apparently not important nor is the fact that the behaviors being learned will necessarily be those tending to serve the immediate custodial goals of the keepers rather than the interest of the subjects themselves mentioned.5 In the same chapter the Walden Two experiment of Twin Oaks in Virginia is discussed.6 Twin Oaks was an attempt to apply the principles articulated by B.F. Skinner to a functioning intentional community. The very promise and problems of this significant experiment is given two pages by our authors. There should have been more. Quickly attention is then turned to Cuba. They note, and rightly so, the strong theoretical parallel between the behavioral assumptions of positive reinforcement theory and Marxism-Leninism, or appear to make the connection since only three paragraphs are devoted to this significant item and even then distortion occurs. The Freemans: “Marx clearly recognized that a period of dictatorship by the proletariat would be a necessary transition phase between bourgeois and Communist regimes. The state, and its coercion could only wither away when resocialization was complete. As Lenin put it...” (p. 61). The Freemans should know that Marx and Engels had little to say about the period of transition, the unfortunate term “dictatorship of the proletariat” was rarely used, and in Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune (1871) it is clear that his approval of the radical democratic and egalitarian policies of Communards suggested a strong belief in the capacity of people to undergo rather rapid change in a revolutionary period in which the state undergoes significant withering at once, rather than over generations.7 It was Lenin, not Marx, who popularized the idea of revolutionary dictatorship and envisioned the necessity of a long transition period after the seizure of power by the party of the working class. For Lenin felt that people
are governed by habit more than a rational calculation and that they can change only slowly in response to changing institutional arrangements. This point of view concerning human learning is most cogently expressed in *The State and Revolution* (1918) but is found elsewhere as well.8 The seizure of power sets the stage for revolutionary change, a process that will be directed by the revolutionary political elite. The failure to develop the theoretical parallelism, apart from a snide comment about Castro "following in the footsteps of his masters", clearly illustrates the tendency, found throughout this book, of a failure or unwillingness to develop points fully and completely.

Again, an illustration of the general point is in order. In the later chapter on major resocialization they intimate that socialization in the People's Republic of China is essentially coercive. (pp. 227-228). The image is of the masses of people being whipped into ideological shape by merciless overseers. No wonder! Their account of "thought reform" is based on writings of western observers during the late 50's and early 60's, observations which relied in turn on the accounts of refugees. The Freemans try to tell us that their dependence in turn is based on the lack of reliable information on China. In fact, this is not the case at all. When they published their book (1975), accounts by Edgar Snow, Joan Robinson, and Wheelwright and McFarlane were available among others.9 Further John Gurley's account of the Maoist assumptions concerning human behavior might have been profitably discussed.10 What unites Snow and the others is a basic sympathy for the Chinese revolution, and, of course, their apparent inability to be included as a reliable source by the Freemans. While we should be willing to entertain a healthy skepticism regarding developments in China, something fundamental has been happening not only in China but in other places as well, which relate directly to the question of control and social change. For example, something very exciting is happening with experimentation in forms of workers' self-management, most notably in Yugoslavia.11 Suppose that workers and other citizens really get in the habit of governing, of taking part in decisions that affect their lives. Imagine the possibility of bringing contingencies to bear on the behavior of managers. Any serious discussion of the psychology of control must deal with potentially effective means of counter control. And workers' self-management which does, of course, have problems,12 would be a good place to begin.13

Turning to the subject of political socialization (where Milgram's experiments should have been discussed) the authors demonstrate a rather far-ranging grasp of empirical studies on the subject. Some useful information on socialization in the Soviet Union, the United States, and Israeli kibbutzim is provided, and yet the result is not completely satisfying. On the one hand we have intentional communities at the local level which have been highly successful. Why? One explanation, offered to account for the amazing success of the primitive Christian communism of the Hutterian Brethren, is that an ideological consensus exists which legitimizes the institutional arrangements. 14 In the case of the Hutterites a successful counter-hegemony has been created. Hegemony, a concept associated with the work of the Italian Marxist and revolutionary Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), is cultural dominance, one particular point of view prevails apropos of Marx's dictum concerning the source of the "ruling ideas" in any society. Gramsci's experience told him that revolutionary ideology and class self-interest were not sufficient in themselves in instilling a revolutionary attitude in the workers. This was because, he argued, the workers have been socialized into acceptance of (or at least significant acquiescence to) the dominant capitalist ideology which prevented them from acting.15 In the United States the dominant values of individualism, limited government, private property, and capitalism, irrelevant as they are as actual descriptions of the political economy,16 still govern in the minds of ordinary citizens with profound effect. These values are in direct contradiction to their own public policy preferences.17 For example, public opinion polls have shown for the last few decades a public willing to support the welfare state and even its expansion on an issue by issue basis,18 and yet, this public support is in fact paper thin because the public, due to the internalization of the dominant values, does not accept the assumptions upon which a welfare, or better still, a socialist state might be based. Further the dominant values, by locating total responsibility in the individual for his or her "fate" (and making it illegitimate to engage in collective political action for social class interests) separates the personal ("my" problem) from the political (perceived as a remote sideshow) and contributes to passivity, indifference, and lack of political involvement. This is admitted, perhaps unintentionally, as an explanation of low voter turnout and indifference offered by a popular textbook in American government: "Most people spend more time worrying about money, sex, illness, crime, the high cost of living, automobile repairs, and a host of other things than they do worrying about politics and political affairs."19 Precisely. All of the "things" people worry about are in fact political issues involving the clash of social interests and potential legislative remedies. But since "most people" think that way it is not surprising that greater and greater numbers of citizens simply stay out of politics. In the last Presidential election only 53 percent of those eligible bothered to vote, and even among voters the majority believed that government did not pay attention to them.20 Further, those who do not participate are drawn disproportionately from disadvantaged social groups, those with low income, minimal education, and low status occupations.21 These low status passives also tend to live in "deviant sub-cultures". For example, in a New York Times—CBS News survey of voters and non-voters a majority of non-voters agreed that "the country needs more radical change than is possible through the ballot box."22 These people bear close watching. Fortunately the dominant ideology reduces the threatening aspects of their estrangement. Murray Edelman has observed: "In their political behavior...the American poor have offered a revealing example of the potency of myth in creating a particular identity and thereby promoting submissiveness and docility in the face of deprivation. Americans are taught at home, in the schools, and in pervasive political rhetoric that America is the land of opportunity; that there is equality before the law;...Given such opportunity, those who are poor are inclined to attribute their unhappy condition to their own failings and inadequacies. Poor people are bound to be troubled by this logical inference and widely held belief...In consequence, the poor have typically been meek, acquiescent in their role and status, and grateful for the welfare they receive...."23 The professor ought to at least give the prince his money's worth and tell him how to keep those folks down on the farm.

He might have stressed the importance of communal rituals, i.e., elections, in cementing the followers to the leaders. In the act of voting, the formal-legal equality of all is
reinforced. The fact that some individuals and social classes have a great deal more influence than others can be partially hidden as all the candidates go through the dumb show of caring and coping. Elections serve to legitimate rulership by giving the impression that the people have in fact selected their government. The obvious fact that there is often no serious competition or that there are no significant differences between the parties insure that elections are more significant as public rituals than means by which ordinary citizens can effectively intervene in the policy process. In the particular instance if the prince is elected, so much the better.

What is a science of human behavior for? Freeman and Freeman provide one answer. It is technique that can be used by those in power to stay in power. Anybody who keeps track of the developments in the United States in the last decade must know that the ruling classes have become obsessed with maintaining control and to that end they have commanded and will continue to command the expertise of those trained in various forms of behavior modification. James G. Holland’s comments on the “politics” of controlling behavior are well-taken: “Persons with authority to manage others, whether nationwide or in small groups in classrooms, prisons, etc...are increasingly looking to the behavioral technologist to further their present objectives.”25 The abuses of such techniques by putative managers of prisons and other institutions is in fact well-documented in a Congressional staff study entitled Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification (1974).26 The study is not well-known in large part because the mass media chose not to make it well known (as opposed to physicians pushing dope in the Carter White House), but it fully documents the obscene coupling of academic prostitutes and government managers in a joint enterprise to find more efficient ways of handling troublesome individuals and social groups. Holland warns us: “Those who apply behavior principles are dealing with the very core of power relationships among people and cannot be considered politically neutral. The choice is whether science is to serve the elite or the people...”27 It is the failure of The Psychology of Political Control to examine all of the implications of a science of behavior that are relevant to politics that is most glaring. A straightforward and theoretically-informed presentation could have accomplished that result. There is a need for a book on the political uses and abuses of a science of behavior. The book reviewed here is not it.

5 The Freemans go so far as to endorse the use of the indeterminate sentence (p. 223). Prisons do not rehabilitate and the indeterminate sentence is one of the most brutal engines of tyranny ever invented, given the immediate self-interests of custodial personnel in prison systems. See Jessica Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 118-137. See also Lloyd Cotter, “Operant Conditioning in a Vietnamese Mental Hospital,” in Roger Ulrich, et. al. (eds.), Vol. 2: Control of Human Behavior (Glencoe: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1970), pp. 100-105. All three volumes are cited by the Freemans in their bibliography. I find the failure to discuss the Cotter piece interesting in light of what the book under review is supposed to be about.
6 Kathleen Kinkade, whose account of Twin Oaks is discussed by the Freemans, had some important insights in the exercise of power. See “Power and the Utopian Assumption,” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 10, no. 3 (1974) pp. 404-414.
13 A recent survey conducted in Yugoslavia as part of a five nation study of political participation shows that 20 percent of the entire population had participated in a self-government body. In industry, almost half of all employees reported having been members of a workers’ council, the governing authority in Yugoslav enterprises. This rate of participation is extraordinary. Sidney Verba and Goldie Shabad, “Workers Councils and Political Stratification: The Yugoslav Experience,” American Political Science Review, 72 (March, 1978), pp. 80-95.
22 Reinhold, op. cit.
25 James G. Holland, "Political Implications of Applying Behavioral Technology," in Roger Ulrich, et. al. (eds.), Vol. 3: Control of Human Behavior (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1974), p. 415. Though the three volumes comprising this series are cited in their bibliography little use was made of the vaste amount of information contained therein. Given the thrust of the book it would have been inappropriate to discuss the comments of Holland since they would have not supported the role played by the professor-consultant.
27 Holland, op. cit., p. 419.