Combat Power and Enterprise Competitiveness
First Monday

Combat Power and Enterprise Competitiveness by John S. Quarterman, Ken Harker, and Peter H. Salus

Abstract
Combat Power and Enterprise Competitiveness by John S. Quarterman, Ken Harker, and Peter H. Salus
If the Spanish Armada had had distributed information for shared awareness, we'd all be speaking Spanish now.

Companies such as GE that do have it are among the most successful. The U.S. military has spent millions of dollars demonstrating that shared situational awareness improves combat effectiveness. Let's look at some examples, and then let's apply the same ideas to intranets and to corporate use of the Internet. Does better distribution of corporate information lead to shared awareness and increased business competitiveness?

Contents

Flying Experiments
Intranets
Internet
Compare
Grasping the Power Shift

 


 

 

 

"Knowledge itself is power."
— Francis Bacon

"Network-centric warfare enables warfighters to leverage this information advantage to dramatically increase combat power... ."
— John J. Garstka

"If you can't measure it, you can't manage it."
— Frank Kaplan

++++++++++

Flying Experiments

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has demonstrated that knowledge is power, or more specifically that shared information leads to shared awareness which leads to combat power. That such a relationship exists is not new, but DoD has quantified specific examples of it that are also generalizable.

The Fog of War

Everyone knows that air combat is difficult and deadly, largely because it is hard to keep track of friend and foe. Clausewitz' fog of war rises into the skies.

"Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen War."
— Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 7.

This fog can be at least partly dissipated through better sharing of information. In other words, by improving internal and external lines of communication, as recommended by Jomini.

"One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can a man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of the highest im portance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility."
— Jomini, The Art of War

What if we go beyond Jomini and expand lines of communication into meshes or networks of communication that permit many relevant parties to see what they need to see when they need to see it? Consider a typical example of two teams of aircraft, four blue and four red. If both teams are using the same model aircraft and most other parameters are similar, the outcome may be hard to predict. Traditionally fighter aircraft have organic sensors (eyes), plus electronic ones (radar) that appear on a headsup display. Pilots communicate via voice radio. Spotting an enemy aircraft is announced via voice, "bogey at 11 o'clock high."

Network-Centric Blue Team

Suppose blue team's aircraft also have a network that lets each headsup display show information from electronic sensors from all blue aircraft. All blue pilots can then see an enemy aircraft on their headsup displays as soon as the first blue aircraft is in range. Blue team doesn't have to use voice to tell what's going on, and blue pilots can see more detail than voice communications would relay. For example they can see the direction and distance from each blue aircraft to the enemy aircraft. Blue team thus has an information advantage. While the lead red aircraft is announcing "bogey at 1 o'clock low," blue team already knows where the red aircraft is, and can use voice for commands and coordination, "two to the left, two to the right."

 

 

Figure 1a indicates distributed information enabling greater richness and reach of information. The vertical axis, labelled Richness, also has markers for some illustrative types of richness. Each red team pilot sees only from the perspective of its single aircraft; that is each red pilot uses only one platform. Such a platform-centric approach can have great precision. A single red aircraft's radar and firing system may lock onto a single enemy aircraft and target it very precisely. But the real problem may be a whole flight of enemy aircraft that have not been seen by that single red aircraft. Meanwhile, if any blue aircraft sights enemy aircraft, all blue team members know about it, so blue team has greater accuracy. Because all blue pilots know all at once, they can react more quickly, resulting in greater timeliness. Similarly, each blue pilot and the flight leader can pick out relevant targets. A single blue aircraft may not be able to see with its own sensors through a local disturbance (such as an exploded aircraft), but other blue aircraft's sensors probably can, so even that obstructed blue aircraft can get a valid picture of the battlespace. Red team platform-centric approach gives it low richness and reach, so red team is shown in the lower left part of this information space, Network-centric blue team has high richness and reach, so it is shown in the upper right part of this information space. The abilities marked on the vertical, Richness, axis will not always occur in the order shown. For example, blue team could get a valid picture of the battlespace and still have difficulty picking relevant targets, if the enemy formation is clever enough. But the order shown is a likely order in which the abilities develop more as the amount of distributed information increases.

Shared Awareness

Red team's aircraft act as individual platforms, seeing only what each single aircraft can see; red team is platform-centric. Blue team's aircraft with their network act as their own sensor grid, making blue team network-centric, and giving them a common view of the battlespace. Blue aircraft can even be connected to a larger sensor grid of information from surveillance aircraft and satellites, giving them a common view of the theatre of operations, and of other relevant parts of the world. This expanding perspective through a wider sensor grid is indicated by the horizontal axis marked Reach in Figure 1a. All of blue team's pilots can see what any of them can see about both red team and blue team's own aircraft. Blue team's network-centric information advantage thus also gives blue team a shared situational awareness.

"In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point with the base ... ."
— Jomini, The Art of War

This network-centric approach augments Jomini's lines of communications by permitting operatives in the field to see things that only staff back at base formerly could have seen, and it permits field pilots, troops, and commanders to see them simultaneously.

Shared situational awareness in turn leads to faster operational tempo, as illustrated in Figure 1b. This is because network-centric aircraft can be self-synchronizing: there is no waiting for voice relaying of information since all blue aircraft can directly see what any of them can see.

"... Interior or central lines will be preferable to exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate of the campaign."
— Jomini, The Art of War

The network-centric approach can be viewed as an implementation of Jomini's interior lines of communications, with the addition that fractions of the forces can see for themselves what needs to be done and in many case synchronize themselves to do it.

 

 

Network-centric aircraft also have an increased loss exchange ratio, as illustrated in Figure 1b. Network-centric blue aircraft are lost less often in encounters than are platform-centric red aircraft.

The result of this greater speed and effectiveness is increased combat power, as illustrated in Figure 1b.

This combat power accrues beyond the current offensive. Greater information reach and richness permits identifying Jomini's strategic lines and points (ports, river valleys, mountain passes, forts, communication hubs, enemy forces, etc.). Knowing where and what they are permits choosing which ones to attack and thus make into decisive points.

Military objectives usually involve effects in the physical domain; shooting at targets, destroying enemy aircraft, holding territory. There's no point in causing physical effects indiscriminately. Information is needed to know what to shoot at. In the information domain, a fast data network enables greater richness and reach of information, for an information advantage. That quantitative information advantage produces a qualitative advantage of shared awareness. Shared awareness is in the cognitive domain of human understanding of information. In the cognitive domain, shared awareness enables faster operational tempo and improved loss exchange ratio. These in turn produce greater combat power. An information advantage in the information domain and shared awareness in the cognitive domain may result in fewer physical effects in the physical domain. But the point of warfare is not just to shoot up the enemy; it is to win the war, and thus take territory, stop the enemy from doing something, or some other political objective.

"It is of course well known that the only source of war is politics — the intercourse of governments and peoples ... . We maintain ... that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means."
— Clausewitz, On War
War really is politics plus other means; war actually takes place in the cognitive domain as much as in the physical domain. A fast data network in the physical domain can enable effects in the information and cognitive domains that affect the physical domain and thus produce the desired political effects in the cognitive domain. Connecting a sensor grid with a data network for information delivery can provide an information advantage that enables shared situational awareness in the cognitive domain, which improves direction of a shooter grid back in the physical domain. All this is in aid of political objectives in the cognitive domain. War is in the mind and a data network provides a better nervous system.

Experimental Results

These results have been demonstrated in extensive empirical studies. For example, the Air Force collected data using F-15Cs during over 12,000 sorties and 19,000 flying hours. The resulting JTIDS Operational Special Project Report to Congress of December 1997 claimed a kill ratio of networked aircraft vs. non-networked of 2.5 to 1.

An Army experiment, Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), demonstrated six times faster planning, much shorter time to fire, and faster attacks at the company level. This increased operational tempo permitted surprising the enemy. And shared situational awareness permitted brigades and companies to engage the enemy longer. The overall result is increased combat power.

In October 1998, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines conducted exercises in the Republic of Korea (South Korea). These exercises dealt with a problem of hundreds of North Korean special operations boats that was previously thought intractable. A network-centric approach permitted shared information to build shared awareness, which in turn enabled bottom-up synchronization that accomplished the mission in half the expected time.

Let's consider a historical analog of that Korean experiment. In 1588 the world's most powerful empire launched a fleet of ships against a small maritime nation. The fleet picked up marines along the way, and mounted a combined service attack. The small maritime nation rebutted with much smaller but more agile ships, which could outmaneuver the big ships. What if the Spanish Armada had had shared information for shared awareness, so that it could track each small ship and turn the next big ship in time to catch it? Weather also took a hand, scattering the Armada and sinking much of it. But with shared awareness, the remains of the Armada could have regrouped and still had a good chance to win, or at least to resupply in the nearby Spanish Netherlands and attack again later. King Philip II of Spain might well have won that war against his cousin Queen Elizabeth I of England, and we could very well all be speaking Spanish now.

U.S. and allied forces employed a network-centric approach in Afghanistan, which is why that war was won so quickly.

Increased Combat Power

A network-centric approach provides greater information reach and richness, for an information advantage in the information domain. That information advantage enables shared situational awareness. Shared awareness is in the cognitive domain, where it produces faster operational tempo and improved loss-exchange ratio, resulting in increased combat power. In other words, data from multiple vantages and broadening richness produces a synergistic effect which alters data into information and then knowledge. This knowledge in the military arena manifests itself as combat power.

"The only situation a commander can know fully is his own; his opponent's he can only know from unreliable intelligence."
— Jomini, The Art of War

Given more reliable intelligence, the probability of winning is increased. It's no news that knowledge is power, but U.S. DoD research has demonstrated it and quantified that shared information is even more powerful.

 

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Intranets

What do DoD experiments with airplanes, ships, and troops have to do with enterprises? It may seem at first that these are very different domains. Air combat is a remarkably short-lived experience. Most sorties involve hours of uneventful flying and ten minutes or less of furious combat. The only real exceptions to this in the history of military aviation were bombers in WWII, who occasionally would be engaged by multiple groups of enemy fighters during a single mission. However, the Gulf war involved bombers flying very long distances to get there. While most of that time may be boring, knowing immediately when there's an enemy sighting is very important. The confidence that you will know that was also one of the things cited in the army maneuver experiment (AWE) as being an advantage.

Still, being highly jacked up and networked in an intense way makes sense in a combat mission. Combat pilots are trained to handle information overload well — for short periods of time. How well does network centric warfare translate to an enterprise setting, where "missions" often last for months and campaigns last for years?

Let's draw some parallels.

The Fog of Enterprise Communications

Coordinating an enterprise is difficult. Anyone who has tried it can attest that organizing internal operations to compete with other enterprises is hard. This is largely due to a need to distribute information. Clausewitz's fog of war seeps through enterprises. Better information dissemination can help dispell it.

Consider a typical enterprise, with organic sensors (eyes) and electronic ones (computers) that are used by per-person interfaces (screen, keyboard, mouse). Workers communicate by voice in meetings, in hall conversations, and by telephone.

Network-Centric Blue Enterprise

Suppose blue enterprise's computers are connected by a network that lets each one display information from all blue computers. For example, minutes of meetings and draft documents can be seen through intranet Web servers. Many conversations can take place online via electronic mail so that participants don't have to all be present at once, and archives can permit following previous discussions. Blue team then doesn't have to use voice to tell what's going on, and blue workers can see more detail than voice communications would relay. For example they can see the distance of each blue worker to the next deliverable, in time and resources. They can see how other blue workers are deployed. Through the Internet and through intranet summaries, they can also see what other companies are deploying, and to whom.

Now progress toward a deliverable cannot be measured as objectively and dispassionately as radar measures distance to an aircraft. However, radar may say exactly how far an aircraft is, but it doesn't say how long until contact, since the enemy pilot may choose to change course. So there's no guaranteed objectivity or accuracy in aircraft sensors for what the pilot really cares about, either. Nonetheless, in both cases, aircraft and enterprise project teams, being able to see indications helps greatly in predicting what the pilots and employees do care about.

 

 

Suppose some workers do not use the network; let's call them red team. Red team workers who are not in a meeting or don't happen to be in the hall when the conversation is going on often don't know what happened. While red team is having a hall meeting to update each other on what they've done lately, blue team already knows all its relevant status and uses its occasional meetings for resource and strategy decisions. This wider reach of information, driven by an intranet, is indicated in Figure 2a on the horizontal axis. Beyond workstations and meetings distributed information permits the formation of agile teams and the development of an agile organization. The vertical axis is labelled the same as on Figure 1a. By increased information richness and reach, blue team gains an information advantage.

Shared Awareness

While red team's computers act as individual platforms, seeing only what each single computer can see, blue team's computers use the network as a sensor grid, making them network-centric. Blue user computers use information from internal enterprise servers, plus information from the larger sensor grid of the Internet. All of blue team's workers can see what any of them can see about both red team and blue team's own projects. Blue team's network-centric information advantage thus also gives blue team a shared situational awareness.

Blue team's shared situational awareness in turn leads to faster operational tempo. This is because network-centric teams can be self-synchronizing: there is no waiting for voice relaying of information since all blue workers can directly see what any of them can see.

Communication Requires Cooperation

Unlike radar, measuring progress toward a deliverable might actually require active help from the target being tracked. The employee needs to fill out status reports, file meeting minutes, and make documents accessible. All of this consumes time that the employee might be using elsewhere. This is markedly different from network-centric warfare, in which aircraft or armored vehicles communicate with one another about their position, speed, fuel levels, and other vital statistics without human intervention or concern. The fighter pilot gains valuable decision-making and communicating time because of the automation. In a networked enterprise, the employee might actually lose decision-making and communicating time because of the networking overhead — whether that loss is offset by the gains experienced from the network situational awareness is not nearly as clear. And the tradeoffs will probably be more beneficial for some than others.

Consider the benefits. If a database schema, for example, is always kept up to date on an internal Web page, how many meetings and telephone calls can be averted that would otherwise be necessary to find out details of that schema? And updating such a Web page should be automatable to the level of push a button and it is generated. That is automation equivalent to the aircraft example.

Increased Operational Tempo

Even for notes that somebody has to write up, putting them online uses automatic distribution, which should also cut down on meeting and talk time.

The Net should be less repetitive updating meeting time and more information available to those who need it. Indeed there may be some people who specialize in writing up minutes and notes and putting them online. But enterprises have such people anyway: project managers and documentors. Using a network-centric approach by publishing via an intranet increases the reach of such information, and thus magnifies its effectiveness. Blue team members can also pull information from relevant projects throughout the Internet, saving research time that would be necessary to develop similar information internally or to find it by other means.

"In addition to substituting for materials, transportation, and energy, knowledge also saves time. Time itself is one of the most important of economic resources, even though it shows up nowhere on a enterprise's balance sheet. Time remains, in effect, a hidden input. Especially when change accelerates, the ability to shorten time — for instance, by communicating swiftly or by bringing new products to market fast — can be the difference between profit and loss."
—Alvin Toffler, Power Shift

Network-centric blue team can usually accomplish projects faster, with fewer people, and with better results than platform-centric red team. Shared awareness permits bottom-up self-synchronization; subteams form as needed. Often such teams can act in parallel, instead of waiting one by one for previous ones to finish. There can be a team for each important project or ongoing operational task, so that more than one person knows what to do, thus minimizing bottlenecks due to a single critical person. Shared awareness permits faster and more thorough review; most blue team workers are available as needed for user testing. These improvements can lead to faster development, quicker time to market, and surprising the competition.

Increased Solidarity

Network-centric workers have increased solidarity which leads to greater worker retention. Employees who know more about the current state of affairs of the enterprise are less likely to believe in the worst and flee. This is not to say that information sharing will solve all problems; it won't. Someone leaving the enterprise should not always be attributed to a lack of "connectedness" with coworkers. An enterprise can fail its employees many other ways, even in a network-centric work environment. But if all other variables are constant, a network-centric environment should retain employees better. An enterprise with happier, more effective employees should be a more cost-effective enterprise.

Greater Productivity

Faster, more effective work means greater productivity, as indicated in Figure 2b.

"The net result of such changes is that companies tend to use fewer but better-paid workers than in the past, and in the fast-growing, leading-edge industries, the old authoritarian command structure is phasing out, replaced by a new, more egalitarian or collegial style of work."
—Alvin Toffler, Power Shift

 

 

Network-centric work methods can be significantly more productive than platform-centric methods.

 

++++++++++

Internet

Enterprises want to use the Internet as a critical business service, to replace leased lines, and to provide new services. They want to do this to get lower costs, more capabilities, and broader reach. Better distribution of military information leads to shared awareness and increased combat power. Does better distribution of corporate information lead to shared awareness and increased business competitiveness?

The Fog of the Internet

The Internet is big and complicated. When it is working well, the Internet is transparent to the users. When it is not, it is opaque to the users, who can not see through the fog of the Internet's complexity.

Consider a typical enterprise, with organic sensors (eyes) and electronic ones (computers) that are used by per-person interfaces (screen, keyboard, mouse). Workers communicate by voice in meetings and hall conversations and by telephone. Call that platform-centric red enterprise.

Network-Centric Blue Enterprise

Now consider network-centric blue entrprise that uses its intranet for minutes, drafts, and online communications, as we discussed in the previous section. And blue enterprise also uses the Internet both to get information, and to communicate with allies and customers.

 

 

Red enterprise's idea of Internet marketing is to use its Web pages like billboards: static and write-only (read-only to the intended market). Blue enterprise's idea of Internet marketing is to put live examples of its products and services on its Web pages, and to entice customers and influencers to interact and buy through them. Blue enterprise may also provide electronic mail discussion lists for its customers, letting them help each other with its services. This reduces load on its own customer support organization while increasing customer satisfaction. It also provides a source of market analysis and validation.

Blue enterprise thus has an information advantage both internally and externally, with its allies and customers. This advantage, derived from better information richness and reach, is illustrated in Figure 3a. This figure differs from Figures 1a and 2a in different labels on the horizontal axis, to indicate a widening external sensor grid, beyond workstations and meetings to the entire enterprise, its market niche, the larger market, and the world. Even if the enterprise does not want to move out of its market niche, using the Internet to help see what other companies may be in related niches in the market can be very useful for outmaneuvering the competition.

Shared Awareness

This information advantage leads to a shared situational awareness, Blue enterprise, its allies, and its customers see what they need when they need it, and much of what they see is shared.

Blue enterprise can operate faster than red enterprise, because blue enterprise is self-synchronizing, not only internally, but also with external advisors, allies, and customers. Advisory boards with access to current and forthcoming services, can volunteer feedback as they have it, without waiting for a meeting. Influencers can see new services as soon as they are made available on the Web. Customers can see services when they are ready to look at them, without waiting for a sales person to fly to their location.

Greater Competitiveness

In market competition, blue enterprise should have a better loss-exchange ratio. This is indicated in Figure 3b on the horizontal axis as sustainable competitive advantage. Not only is blue corp. faster, more informative, and more interactive. It should also have less cost for sales and marketing, and more solidarity and retention of personnel and customers. More satisfied customers should bring more profit.

 

 

In other words, blue enterprise should be significantly more competitive than red enterprise.

"The benefits of communication — whether Morse's telegraph, Bell's telephone, or today's high-speed data networks — are relative. If no one has them, all competing firms operate, as it were, at the same neural transmission rate. But when some do and others don't, the competitive arena is sharply tilted."
—Alvin Toffler, Power Shift

What should be the factor of increased competitiveness? Perhaps that of Dell over its rivals, or Paypal over traditional billpaying services, or GE over its competitors.

 

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Compare

Let's compare the three domains: military, intranet, and Internet.

Compare Three Domains

 
Military
Intranet
Internet
the fog
of war
of coordination of corporate communications
of complexity of the Internet cloud
platform-centric red team
organic sensors, electronic sensors on headsup display, voice communications
organic sensors, computer workstations, meetings, hall conversations, telephone
as for intranet
network-centric blue team
plus networked electronic sensors on headsup display
intranet Web servers with minutes and drafts, mailing lists, archives
as for intranet, plus interactive Web marketing and sales
blue information advantage
can see friend and foe; exogenous sensors for even wider view
has status, can see inside and outside via the Internet
as for intranet, plus also with advisors and customers
shared situational awareness
whole team sees all this all at once
whole team sees all this when it needs it
company, advisors, and customers see what they need when they need it
faster operational tempo
self-synchronizing
self-synchronizing
self-synchronizing, including with advisors and customers
better loss-exchange ratio
surprise and coordination
more solidarity and retention
solidarity and retention of personnel and customers, and less cost for sales and marketing
increased combat power
2.5-10 times
4-10 times
? times competitiveness

 

Shared information inside a corporation and with its allies and customers provides greater information richness and reach, and produces shared awareness. Shared awareness in turn enables faster operational tempo and sustainable competitive advantage. This all spells increased competitiveness.

This is the same idea that DoD demonstrates leads to increased combat power in the military. When applied to corporate competition, this is Alvin Toffler's power shift. Corporations that ride Toffler's third wave of information gain shared awareness and through it competitiveness. Toffler's thesis of 1990 has been systematized and validated by military experiments at the turn of the new century. Shared information becomes knowledge becomes competitive power.

 

++++++++++

Grasping the Power Shift

For an enterprise to grasp this power shift and gain competitiveness, it must be able to depend on the Internet as if it were an intranet. Such dependability doesn't necessarily mean identical performance. However, it does mean observable and predictable performance. If you can't measure it, you can't manage it. Internet performance measurement is the missing key to corporate competiveness. Internet performance measurement enables enterprises to use the Internet as if it were their own, in order to get shared situational awareness and through it greater competitiveness.

"The benefits of communication — whether Morse's telegraph, Bell's telephone, or today's high-speed data networks — are relative. If no one has them, all competing firms operate, as it were, at the same neural transmission rate. But when some do and others don't, the competitive arena is sharply tilted."
—Alvin Toffler, Power Shift
"The end of theory is a set of principles to serve as a guide for action."
— Colonel Richard M. Swain, quoted by Col. John Osgood

By "end" he means the purpose. The principles elaborated in this paper constitute a theory that evidence (both military and commercial) demonstrates do provide a guide to practical action.

 

 

An enterprise that is used to using only leased lines that it controls directly may be surprised by just how complicated the Internet is. Consider Metcalfe's Law:

Metcalfe's Law

"The usefulness, or utility, of a network equals the square of the number of users."

This law makes sense because any pair of users may choose to communicate. These increasing possible combinations of users are also increasing complexity of the network. A typical intranet may have hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of nodes. However, the Internet has hundreds of millions of nodes and even more users than nodes. So by Metcalfe's law alone, the Internet is millions of times more complex than an intranet.

For performance, it is necessary to take into account not only the endpoints, users and servers, but also paths between the endpoints. Thus the complexity of Internet performance increases faster than the square of its users.

The Internet is so much more complex than an intranet that there is no point in trying to assign a specific factor to how much more complex; the Internet is qualitatively different from an intranet.

Not only does the complexity of the Internet increase faster than the square of its users, the ability to actually control that complexity devolves onto an ever-increasing number of uncoordinated entities. No only does no enterprise control the entire Internet, no enterprise nor government has a good view of the entire Internet.

Intranet performance management by comparison is well-understood. Many vendors sell intranet performance measurements and management products and services, many of which can be run by an enterprise.

Internet peformance measurement requires an independent third party, because no enterprise controls the entire Internet. For that matter, an enterprise usually does not even control the ISPs it uses to buy Internet connectivity. While any given ISP would probably like for an enterprise to contract entirely with that one ISP for access to all of its suppliers, customers, etc. through that ISP alone, that is not usually practical, since those suppliers, customers, information sources, etc. usually have their own contracts convenient for them for Internet access with perhaps other ISPs. This is one of the main reasons the Internet is a network of networks. Unfortunately, without measurement, such decentralization puts the enterprise at the mercy of the ISPs.

With Internet performance measurement, an enterprise can hold ISPs accountable for Service Level Agreements (SLAs). An enterprise can even better influence ISPs that it does not pay directly, yet that carry some traffic between the enterprise and its clients.

With measurement, an enterprise can take more control over its use of the Internet. End of article

 

About the Authors

John S. Quarterman is CTO at Matrix NetSystems, Inc.
E-mail: jsq@matrix.net
Direct comments to jsq@quarterman.com

Ken Harker is Cartographer at Matrix NetSystems, Inc.
E-mail: kharker@matrix.net

Peter H. Salus is CKO at Matrix NetSystems, Inc.
E-mail: peter@matrix.net

 

References

"Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory"
(http://www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/dec00/feature.htm) by John J. Garstka, Joint Staff Directorate for C4 Systems, john.garstka@js.pentagon.mil is the source for the examples in "Flying Experiments."

On War (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/On_War/ONWARTOC.html) by Carl von Clausewitz. The quotations used herein are taken from the J.J. Graham translation, London, 1873.

Treatise on Grand Military Operations and The Art of War (http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/JominiSP.html) by Antoine-Henri Jomini. The quotations used herein are taken from the G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, translation (Philadelphia: Lippicott, 1892).

The Hedgehog and the Fox: Jomini, Clausewitz, and History, Colonel Richard M. Swain, U.S. Army, quoted in Osgood; see below.

"Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and Military Strategy," (http://pw1.netcom.com/~jrosgood/w12.htm) by Colonel John Osgood, Retired.

The Third Wave and Power Shift, by Alvin Toffler contain extended discussion on the uses and effects of information by and on enterprises.


Editorial history

Paper received 12 December 2002; accepted 24 December 2002.


Contents Index

Copyright ©2003, First Monday

Copyright ©2003, John S. Quarterman

Copyright ©2003, Ken Harker

Copyright ©2003, Peter H. Salus

Combat Power and Enterprise Competitiveness by John S. Quarterman, Ken Harker, and Peter H. Salus
First Monday, volume 8, number 1 (January 2003),
URL: http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue8_1/quarterman/index.html





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